Beyond Enforcement: A Coordinated Response to the Complex Challenges Surrounding Homelessness

1. The Problem Isn’t Always What It Appears to Be

The same downtown block generates another complaint. Officers respond, outreach workers offer assistance, and a cleanup addresses the immediate conditions. A few days later, many of the same concerns return. Residents and businesses are frustrated, municipal leaders face pressure to act, and police find themselves responding to a problem that never seems fully resolved.

After 24 years in law enforcement, I understand that frustration. I've seen recurring problems consume substantial time and resources even when officers are doing what is reasonably expected of them. The question is whether we can achieve better results by looking more closely at what is actually happening.

We often describe a troubled downtown block or encampment as one enormous problem involving homelessness, drugs, mental health, crime, and disorder. But what if several distinct, sometimes interconnected problems occupy the same space? Homelessness itself is not criminal conduct. Nor are substance use, a behavioral health crisis, threats, illegal dumping, and poor property management interchangeable. A useful starting point is to distinguish harmful or unlawful conduct, unsafe conditions, unmet service needs, and complaints based primarily on someone's presence or appearance. These may overlap, but they do not necessarily share the same causes or solutions.

This article is not a criticism of officers or partners already working hard, nor an argument against enforcement. It is a practical way to look beyond the immediate complaint, identify what is really driving recurring harm, and coordinate the people best positioned to address it.

2. Look Beyond the Call: Understanding What’s Really Happening

Consider an illustrative commercial corridor with repeated calls about trespassing, threatening behavior, suspected drug activity, and trash. It may be labeled a homelessness problem, but closer examination might show that a few individuals are responsible for documented threats, others are seeking somewhere to sleep, a vacant building is poorly secured, and outreach services are difficult to access. These are possibilities to investigate, not conclusions to assume. Each verified finding would point toward a different response.

Problem-oriented policing provides a useful structure for this work. Its SARA process—Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment—starts by defining the recurring problem and examining the conditions behind it. A systematic review found that problem-oriented policing can reduce crime and disorder, although results vary by setting and intervention.[1] The first question should not be, ‘What operation should we run?’ It should be, ‘What, specifically, are we trying to change?’

Begin with information the agency already has: calls for service, incident reports, locations, times, recurring people or properties, and previous responses. Ten calls might reflect ten different incidents or one unresolved condition generating repeated complaints. Don't assume the number of calls tells the whole story.

Involve crime analysts whenever possible. Their role extends far beyond sending bulletins. Instead of requesting only a call list, ask which behaviors generate the most repeat incidents, where and when they occur, whether the same people or properties appear repeatedly, and whether prior enforcement changed the pattern. Agencies without an analyst should ask whether a regional crime analysis center, fusion center, or neighboring agency can assist; capabilities vary, but it is worth asking.[2]

Then compare the records with what people know firsthand. Talk with responding officers, business owners, residents, property managers, outreach workers, and people directly affected. They may explain patterns, service barriers, or safety concerns that never appear in an incident report. Separate verified facts from assumptions and unanswered questions.

Pay attention to social dynamics without stereotyping. People sometimes gather for protection, companionship, or shared resources; research has documented mutual support within encampments.[3] Other locations may involve intimidation, exploitation, or a small number of people influencing harmful behavior. Determine what is actually occurring and who is responsible. Look just as closely at the place itself: lighting, access, vacant buildings, waste, and maintenance may be aggravating the situation.[2]

For example, an analyst may find that incidents cluster on weekend evenings, while a business owner identifies an unsecured rear entrance as a frequent gathering point. These details are more useful than declaring the entire corridor unsafe. Analysts should also examine gaps in reporting and classification: police records may miss real concerns, while complaints may not always describe the same underlying conduct. Neither source tells the full story by itself.

Analysis need not become a six-month research project. The point is to gather enough reliable information to distinguish the problems and make a better decision about what to do next.

3. The Right Response Requires the Right People

Police have a clear role in responding to threats, violence, victimization, criminal conduct, and immediate safety concerns. Yet they often shoulder much of the responsibility for recurring community problems simply because they are available around the clock and are the first ones called. That does not mean they have the authority, resources, or expertise to resolve every contributing condition—and they should not be expected to. The work calls for a coordinated community response, not police acting alone.

The potential partners extend well beyond the organizations we routinely contact. Table 1 offers a practical look at who may be able to contribute, including some resources that are easy to overlook. It is drawn in part from the partnership guidance in my Comprehensive Field Guide to Proactive Crime Prevention.[4] The list is illustrative, not exhaustive; every community has different capabilities, and no single problem needs every partner listed. The point is to recognize the expertise, authority, relationships, and resources already available, then bring the right people together around the particular issues involved.

The table makes one thing clear: law enforcement is only one of many potential contributors. Collaboration should not mean other organizations simply assisting police. Officers may address criminal conduct and safety threats, while outreach providers, municipal departments, property owners, and others tackle different contributing conditions. Partners may also need one another's assistance. Preliminary findings from a meta-analysis suggest that broader problem-oriented policing responses involving more agencies or groups may have larger effects, although less-intensive approaches can also be effective.[5] That is a reason to match partners to the problem, not to invite every organization to every meeting.

Getting people into a meeting is not the same as solving a problem. The coordinating organization need not be the police; leadership should reflect the principal issue, available authority, and capacity to carry the work forward. A coordinator can track commitments and identify obstacles without necessarily having authority over other agencies. Each partner should agree on a realistic task, an owner, a deadline, and how progress will be checked. Partners also need a lawful way to share relevant information and a practical way to resolve disagreements or missed commitments.

4. From Understanding the Problem to Doing Something About It

SARA's Response stage turns what we've learned into action. At our illustrative corridor, that might include focused investigation or enforcement against documented threats or drug distribution; outreach and treatment connections for people seeking assistance; and maintenance, sanitation, and access improvements to address neglected conditions. Research supports targeted hot-spots policing and, in suitable settings, improved street lighting to reduce some crimes, particularly property crime.[6][7] Different problems call for different responses, and no single intervention is likely to resolve them all.

Prioritize the greatest immediate risks, then set a few specific goals: fewer threats to employees, a secured building, safer access to public spaces, or more meaningful connections to services. Record the starting conditions and decide how each outcome will be measured before acting. Confirm who has responsibility for each intervention, what resources are actually available, and when progress will be reviewed.

Offering help does not guarantee that someone can or will accept it. Mistrust, past experiences, restrictive program rules, transportation difficulties, lack of suitable openings, or immediate survival needs may stand in the way. Repeated missed appointments can frustrate providers and responders, but they also signal a need to understand the barrier rather than assume a referral solved the issue. Appropriate providers should continue reasonable, voluntary engagement and check whether assistance was actually received. Some intensive and specialized case-management approaches improve housing stability and selected other outcomes, although effectiveness depends on the model and population.[8] Equally important, coordination cannot create shelter beds, affordable housing, or treatment capacity that does not exist; those gaps must be identified and addressed at the appropriate level.

Declining voluntary assistance does not exempt anyone from laws that otherwise apply. Threats, violence, property damage, trespassing, and other unlawful acts may warrant an appropriate response, depending on the facts, applicable law, evidence, and available alternatives. The conduct—not the refusal of services—should guide that decision. Support and accountability can proceed together.

Partners can sequence work according to urgency and capacity. A serious threat may require action today, a code inspection might occur this week, building repairs may take longer, and outreach may continue for months. Dependencies matter: a referral is of limited value if transportation, eligibility, or an actual appointment has not been confirmed.

Clearing an encampment may address an immediate safety or environmental hazard, but without planning for outreach, genuinely available services, lawful handling of belongings, and management of the site afterward, conditions may return or move elsewhere. Modeling involving unsheltered people who inject drugs raises concerns about possible health harms from repeated involuntary displacement; those projections are not direct evidence about every local clearance.[9] Jurisdictions should review relevant ordinances, notice and property procedures, disability accommodations, and applicable court requirements with appropriate legal counsel. Urgent threats may still require prompt lawful action, but short-term measures should support longer-term work whenever practical.[10]

Before putting the response into operation, I also apply a practitioner-developed feasibility check I call the R.E.A.L. Test: Is it Realistic, Executable, Adaptable, and Lasting? It complements SARA by asking whether the proposed plan can actually work under local conditions.

Realistic: Does the plan fit the actual staffing, authority, funding, and services available? If daily outreach is impossible, could a county provider visit twice weekly instead?

Executable: Who owns each task, by when, and how will completion be confirmed? A promised repair or referral should not be mistaken for a completed action.

Adaptable: What happens when the first approach doesn't work? If enforcement reduces threats but sanitation remains poor, fix the sanitation issue rather than repeating the same operation. If transportation keeps people from appointments, address that barrier.

Lasting: Who maintains improvements when the initial attention ends? A locked building, cleaned property, and referral process mean little if nobody takes responsibility for what comes next.

For example, if a provider schedules treatment but transportation falls through, that is a barrier requiring follow-up, not proof that assistance was completed. If a landlord misses a deadline to secure an entrance, the coordinator should identify the obstacle and involve the authority best positioned to address it. These checks distinguish a plan on paper from work carried out in practice.

A small agency can begin with one location and a few relevant partners. The goal is not the largest initiative; it is a workable response that can be carried out and sustained.

5. Measuring Progress and Making Improvements Last

Activity is not the same as improvement. Arrests, outreach contacts, referrals, and cleanup totals may show what partners did, but not whether the underlying problems improved. SARA's Assessment stage asks both whether the planned actions occurred and whether conditions changed.[11]

Measure each problem against its own objective. If employees were being threatened, compare the frequency and seriousness of incidents and ask the affected businesses what has changed. If a building was secured, check whether unauthorized entry actually stopped. If sanitation was the issue, inspect whether the site remains clean. If services were offered, the appropriate providers should assess engagement and outcomes—not just referrals—using information they may lawfully share.

Analysts can compare trends before and after an intervention, ideally against longer-term patterns or a reasonable comparison location where feasible. Smaller agencies can use basic records, site observations, and partner reports. Fewer calls may indicate improvement, but they may also reflect underreporting; weather, seasonal patterns, and unrelated changes can affect the figures.[11]

Look beyond the original block. If criminal activity or an encampment moves around the corner, improvement at the original site may not mean the broader concern was resolved. Research on crime displacement shows that movement of crime is not inevitable, and a Denver observational study of encampment clearances found different crime patterns depending on offense, time, and distance from the site; neither finding proves the effects of any particular local operation.[12][13] Relocation of people experiencing homelessness must also be distinguished from displacement of criminal activity.

The measures should fit the time frame. Repairs might be assessed within weeks; sustained outreach or housing stability may require a longer view. A simple monthly discussion among the responsible partners can reveal whether problems are declining, remaining unchanged, or appearing somewhere else. Where results are mixed, it is better to say so than to claim a success that the evidence does not establish.

Check progress throughout the effort, not only at the end. Partners should distinguish completed tasks from outcomes, report mixed results candidly, adjust what is not working, and assign responsibility for maintaining improvements. Success might include fewer threats, safer public spaces, stable housing for some individuals, better access to treatment, or improved property conditions. These are different results and should be measured separately.

Conclusion — Beyond Enforcement Does Not Mean Without Enforcement

Moving beyond enforcement means using lawful enforcement where needed while also addressing the conditions that allow recurring harm and disorder to continue. It requires separating problems that have different causes, matching responsibilities to the partners equipped to address them, and checking whether the combined response makes a meaningful difference.

The next time your agency or community confronts the same complaints at the same location, consider whether you are looking at one problem or several. No single officer, agency, organization, or individual can solve everything, but each may have something valuable to contribute. Lasting improvement doesn't always begin with extraordinary resources. Sometimes it begins with looking at a familiar problem differently, bringing the right people together, and following through on what each has agreed to do.

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References

[1] Hinkle, J. C., Weisburd, D., Telep, C. W., & Petersen, K. (2020). Problem-oriented policing for reducing crime and disorder: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 16(2), e1089. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1089

[2] Clarke, R. V., & Eck, J. E. (2005). Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. https://popcenter.org/content/crime-analysis-problem-solvers-60-small-steps

[3] Boucher, L. M., Dodd, Z., Young, S., Shahid, A., Bayoumi, A. M., Firestone, M., & Kendall, C. E. (2022). “They have their security, we have our community”: Mutual support among people experiencing homelessness in encampments in Toronto during the COVID-19 pandemic. SSM - Qualitative Research in Health, 2, 100163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmqr.2022.100163

[4] Burgess, M. S. (2026). The Comprehensive Field Guide to Proactive Crime Prevention: Strategies, Technology, Partnerships, and Playbooks for Smarter Policing and Safer Communities. Independently published. ISBN 9798247777595.

[5] Hinkle, J. C., Weisburd, D., Telep, C. W., & Petersen, K. (2024). When is problem-oriented policing most effective? A systematic examination of heterogeneity in effect sizes for reducing crime and disorder. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 18, paae053. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paae053

[6] Braga, A. A., Turchan, B., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2019). Hot spots policing of small geographic areas effects on crime. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 15(3), e1046. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1046

[7] Welsh, B. C., Farrington, D. P., & Douglas, S. (2022). The impact and policy relevance of street lighting for crime prevention: A systematic review based on a half-century of evaluation research. Criminology & Public Policy, 21(3), 739–765. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12585

[8] Ponka, D., Agbata, E., Kendall, C., et al. (2020). The effectiveness of case management interventions for the homeless, vulnerably housed and persons with lived experience: A systematic review. PLOS ONE, 15(4), e0230896. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230896

[9] Barocas, J. A., Nall, S. K., Axelrath, S., et al. (2023). Population-level health effects of involuntary displacement of people experiencing unsheltered homelessness who inject drugs in US cities. JAMA, 329(17), 1478–1486. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2023.4800

[10] U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness. (2024). 19 Strategies for Communities to Address Encampments Humanely and Effectively. https://www.usich.gov/guidance-reports-data/federal-guidance-resources/19-strategies-communities-address-encampments

[11] Eck, J. E. (2017). Assessing Responses to Problems: Did It Work? An Introduction for Police Problem-Solvers (2nd ed.). Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Tool Guide No. 1. Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. https://www.popcenter.org/content/assessing-responses-problems-did-it-work-2nd-edition

[12] Guerette, R. T. (2009). Analyzing Crime Displacement and Diffusion. Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Tool Guide No. 10. Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. https://www.popcenter.org/content/analyzing-crime-displacement-and-diffusion

[13] Padmanabhan, P., Jurecka, C., Nall, S. K., Goldshear, J. L., & Barocas, J. A. (2025). Association of involuntary displacement of people experiencing homelessness and crime in Denver, CO: A spatiotemporal analysis. Journal of Urban Health, 102(1), 8–